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ABSTRACT 
 
This article explores the relevance of the Theory of Planned Behavior to 
whistleblowing research, and considers whether its widely tested validity as a model of 
the link between attitudes, intention and behavior might make it an appropriate 
candidate for a general theory to account for whistleblowing.  This proposition is 
developed through an empirical test of the theory‟s predictive validity for 
whistleblowing intentions.  Using a sample of 296 Korean police officers, the analysis 
showed attitude, subjective norm and perceived behavioral control all had significantly 
positive main effects on internal whistleblowing intentions, but for external 
whistleblowing intentions only subjective norm was significant.  The implications of 
these findings for applying the Theory of Planned Behavior to whistleblowing research 
are discussed. 
Keywords: whistleblowing, Theory of Planned Behavior 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The absence of a general theory of whistleblowing was first noted as a significant 
problem for researchers over twenty years ago (Miceli and Near, 1988) and despite a 
growing volume of high-quality research, the problem remains.  It is a problem both 
theoretical and practical.  Policymakers, both organizational and governmental, have a 
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keen interest in the successful implementation of legal and organizational systems 
which would encourage the reporting of illegal or unethical behavior, yet without a 
comprehensive theoretical framework to account for whistleblowing behavior, 
researchers can offer only limited advice on the design of such systems.   
In part the problem of theory development arises from the difficulties inherent in 
studying whistleblowing behavior directly, which led researchers to resort to indirect 
measures such as attitudes.  Attitudes are however a problematic measure – though 
many employees have positive attitudes towards whistleblowing (they think it is 
morally right and necessary) few actually take action when the time comes to do so.  
This evidence of a disjunction between attitude and behavior led some researchers to 
use intention as a proxy measure for whistleblowing behavior, as intentions have 
proved to be better predictors of behavior than attitudes (Ajzen, 1988). 
The present article seeks to draw together these two issues – the lack of a general 
theory, and the linkages between attitude, intention and behavior in whistleblowing – 
through an examination of Ajzen‟s (1991) Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB).  TPB is 
by far the most widely applied theory on the links between attitudes, intention and 
behavior, which makes it all the more surprising that whistleblowing researchers have 
thus far largely failed to draw upon it.  TPB has already been shown to be an effective 
theoretical framework for predicting intentions of ethical behavior (Randall & Gibson, 
1991; Chang, 1998; McMillan & Conner, 2003; Buchan, 2005) and the present article 
seeks to extend its application to the study of whistleblowing.  In this article we will 
seek to demonstrate the utility of applying TPB to whistleblowing, through a study 
which tests two propositions derived from the theory. 
The primary objectives of this study were to investigate the predictors of 
whistleblowing intentions and compare their roles in two types of whistleblowing – 
internal and external.  First, we examined the effects of attitude, subjective norms, and 
perceived behavioral control on whistleblowing intentions, all of which, the theory 
suggests, determine intentions and human behaviors.  Second, we compared the 
influence of these three components on intentions in external versus internal 
whistleblowing.  If we can successfully predict how an employee‟s intentions to blow 
the whistle are activated, it will be helpful to organizational leaders in their quest to 
instill an ethical culture and establish training programs that can more effectively 
influence employees to act ethically. 
The article first reviews the Theory of Planned Behavior as a theoretical framework 
for predicting whistleblowing intentions, then develops research hypotheses that focus 
on the intentions of whistleblowing.  Succeeding sections present the method of data 
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collection and variable measurement, and examine the results of data analysis.   
Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings and the directions for future 
research. 
 
APPLYING THE THEORY OF PLANNED BEHAVIOR TO 
WHISTLEBLOWING 
Ajzen‟s (1991) theory of planned behavior (TPB) has already proved to be a useful 
theoretical tool to predict ethical or unethical behavior (Randall & Gibson, 1991; 
Chang, 1998; McMillan & Conner, 2003; Carpenter & Reimers, 2005).  For example, to 
predict the unauthorized copying of software, Chang (1998) evaluated the influence of 
the three components of the theory (attitude, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral 
control) on intention to behave unethically, using data from 181 university students.  He 
found TPB was an effective theoretical framework in predicting intention for unethical 
behavior.  Randall & Gibson (1991) applied TPB to the prediction of ethical decision-
making in the medical profession and reported that the theory successfully explained 
intent to report wrongdoing.  In their study, attitudes, subjective norm, and perceived 
behavioral control accounted for a significant portion (61%) of the variance in the intent 
of ethical decision making.  Fukukawa (2002) applied TPB to a consumer‟s ethically 
questionable behavior in order to explain its complexity, and Bobek & Hatfield (2003) 
employed the theory as a theoretical framework for exploring taxpayers‟ intentions to 
comply with tax laws.  Parker et al. (1992) applied TPB to the prediction of drivers‟ 
intentions to commit driving violations, and their findings supported the theory for 
predicting these intentions.  In addition, there have been a number of studies that used 
the theory to predict behavior pertaining to ethical issues, for instance, consumer 
misbehavior (Tonglet, 2002), dishonest actions (Beck & Ajzen, 1991), and waste 
behavior (Teo & Loosemore, 2001). 
The Theory of Planned Behavior seems particularly suitable for explaining 
whistleblowing intentions, in that it is an action performed based on a highly complex 
psychological process (Gundlach et al, 2003).  Furthermore Ajzen‟s theory has been 
widely accepted as a tool to analyze differences between attitude and intention as well 
as intention and behavior.  In this respect, the attempt to use TPB as an approach to 
explaining whistleblowing may help overcome some of the limitations of previous 
studies, and provide a means to understand the widely observed gap between attitude 
and behavior. 
TPB postulates that intention to carry out a behavior is a function of three types of 
underlying beliefs, which are conceptually independent of each other: (1) attitude 
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toward the behavior, which is determined by beliefs about the consequences of that 
behavior, (2) a subjective norm about it, which is determined by normative beliefs, and 
(3) perceived behavioral control, which is determined by beliefs about resources and 
opportunities available to perform the behavior (Ajzen, 1991).  An attitude is an 
individual‟s appraisal of how much he or she approves or disapproves of a specific 
behavior.  In general, a person develops attitudes based on the beliefs he or she has 
about the behavior under consideration by associating that behavior with certain 
consequences.  TPB assumes that beliefs about the consequences of a given behavior 
contribute to form the attitude toward that behavior.  The degree of the belief in, and 
the subjective importance of, certain consequences interact to determine attitude 
toward the behavior.  Thus, an attitude is sum of the products of the strength of each 
salient belief (in the consequences of a specific behavior) and the subjective evaluation 
of how much the belief‟s attributes are important (for that individual).  An attitude 
toward whistleblowing (the extent to which an individual has a favorable or 
unfavorable evaluation of whistleblowing) is the sum of the products of the employee‟s 
beliefs about the consequences of whistleblowing and his or her subjective evaluation 
of those consequences.  The consequences of whistleblowing, as they are implied in 
the objectives of whistleblower protection statutes (Callahan & Dworkin, 2000), 
include prevention of harm to an organization, control of corruption, enhancement of 
public interest, an employee‟s doing his or her duty and moral satisfaction, etc.  These 
are positive consequences, in that whistleblowing is largely considered as a positive 
behavior to be encouraged in a workplace. 
A subjective norm is defined as “the perceived social pressure to perform or not to 
perform the behavior” (Ajzen 1991, p.188).  It is based on normative beliefs, which are 
a person‟s thoughts about “the likelihood that important referent individuals or groups 
approve or disapprove of performing a given behavior” (Ajzen, 1991, p.195), and is 
represented by the sum of different normative beliefs multiplied by a person‟s 
motivation to meet the expectations of “important others”, which for a whistleblower 
are family members, coworkers, immediate supervisor, friends, and neighbors. 
The third determinant of intention, perceived behavioral control, refers to “the 
perceived ease or difficulty of performing the behavior” (Ajzen, 1991, p.188).  
According to the theory, a behavior or intention is dependent on the resources and 
opportunities available to an individual to perform a specific behavior (Ajzen, 1991).  
The obstacles or risks inherent in performing a behavior are termed control factors, and 
it is assumed that beliefs in them are influenced by past experience as well as second-
hand information about the behavior acquired from the experiences of acquaintances 
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and friends, or others (Ajzen, 1991).  Thus, perceived behavioral control is a 
psychological construct rather than a measure of actual control although Ajzen (1991) 
notes that through experience the individual‟s perceived behavioral control will often 
approximate closely to actual behavioral control – in other words, we become astute 
judges of the constraints we face.  Perceived behavioral control in whistleblowing can 
be estimated by means of both control factors and an evaluation of their importance.  
One of the control factors of whistleblowing comes from the beliefs about the 
organizational hindrances, namely, thwarting or intentional ignoring of the reporting.  
Another is associated with the personal negative beliefs, such as the perceived 
impossibility of successfully correcting the wrongdoing by reporting it in the 
organization, and concern about retaliation due to the reporting, with the latter being 
considered one of the most important control factors that discourage employees from 
reporting illegitimate activities (Miceli & Near, 1992; Mesmer-Magnus & 
Viswesvaran, 2005).  To an employee who intends to blow the whistle it might be 
important how much he or she is protected from retaliation (Gorta and Forell, 1995) 
and certainly legislators have assumed that legal protection of whistleblowers is one of 
the most effective ways to encourage an employee to report wrongdoing in their 
organization.   
TPB proposes that human behavior is influenced by these three factors through their 
influence on shaping an individual‟s intention to perform the behavior (Ajzen, 1987, 
1991).  Intention, which the theory defines as the extent to which an individual willingly 
tries to perform a specific behavior, is a central factor in motivating him or her to 
perform the behavior.  Figure 1 shows how whistleblowing intentions would be 
predicted by the Theory of Planned Behavior. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
A key issue which arises in examining whistleblowing intention is that 
whistleblowing is not a single behavior – there are various ways in which the individual 
employee might blow the whistle and there is no reason to assume that each way will be 
associated with the same attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioral control.  
Park et al. (2008) suggest six distinct ways to blow the whistle based on three choices 
which face the would-be whistleblower – internal versus external, anonymous versus 
identified, formal versus informal.  Of these, the distinction between internal versus 
external whistleblowing is most widely discussed in the literature (Callahan & Dworkin, 
2000; Dworkin & Callahan, 1991; Dworkin & Baucus, 1998; Miceli & Near, 1992) and 
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would also seem to be likeliest to be associated with different attitudes, subjective 
norms etc.  Dworkin & Baucus (1998) reported that external whistleblowers tend to 
experience more extensive organizational retaliation than internal whistleblowers.  
External whistleblowing tends to cause greater damage to an employee‟s coworkers and 
the employer than internal whistleblowing, as the latter can give the organization an 
opportunity to fix inappropriate practices (Miceli & Near, 1988).  To justify external 
whistleblowing, the employee may be expected to exhaust the internal procedures 
available for report wrongdoing before s/he blows the whistle to the outside (Grant, 
2002).  The external whistleblower, who may be seen as a traitor by his or her 
employers and coworkers (Dworkin & Callahan, 1991), is more likely to be subjected to 
retaliation than the internal whistleblower. 
External and internal whistleblowing must therefore be treated as qualitatively 
different behaviors.  For example, it would be quite possible for the same individual to 
view raising concerns about a matter within the organization as wholly appropriate, 
whilst considering the act of going to external agencies as a betrayal.  Similarly, given 
the evidence that external whistleblowers experience much greater hostility and 
retaliation, we might expect there to be much more negative subjective norms and 
perceived behavioral control for this kind of whistleblowing.  For all these reasons, we 
suggest that the effects of the three determinants in TPB (attitude, subjective norm, and 
perceived behavior control) will differ significantly in predicting intention for these two 
types of whistleblowing. 
The underlying premise of this study is that the Theory of Planned Behavior may 
represent a parsimonious theoretical framework for predicting whistleblowing 
intentions.  We have shown how this framework might be applied to whistleblowing, 
and why we might expect the three factors (attitude, subjective norm and perceived 
behavioral control) to show differing levels of influence for internal and external 
whistleblowing.  We would expect attitude to be a significant predictor for both types of 
whistleblowing, but we suggest perceived behavioral control and subjective norm may 
have differing levels of influence for internal versus external whistleblowing.  By 
choosing to blow the whistle externally, an individual avoids the many organizational 
barriers which exist for the internal whistleblower, and therefore perceived behavioral 
control is likely to be a less significant factor for external whistleblowing.  However, 
external whistleblowers are aware their actions are likely to be viewed by their 
employers as a betrayal, and we might therefore expect that having the support of 
significant referents will be seen as important.  For this reason, we suggest subjective 
norm will be a more significant factor for external whistleblowing. 
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Hypothesis 1: Perceived behavioral control will be a better predictor of intentions 
for internal whistleblowing than external whistleblowing. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Subjective norm will be a better predictor of intentions for external 
whistleblowing than internal whistleblowing. 
 
Testing these hypotheses will contribute to expanding the knowledge needed for the 
improvement of a whistleblower protection system, the channels for reporting 
wrongdoing, and a training program for ethical management. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Data Collection 
The data for this study were collected from South Korean police officers between 
November 2003 and May 2004.  The officers were all delegates on job-training 
programs at regional policy agencies and stations throughout the country.  
Questionnaires were distributed to 16 randomly selected sites, with 20-30 
questionnaires allocated to each site, depending on class size.  Five investigators, who 
had been instructed about the goals and contents of this study, visited these workplaces 
with the cooperation of the personnel department‟s chief officer.  The questionnaire 
cover letter, which contained a short explanation of the study, assured respondents that 
their responses were for research purposes only and would be kept confidential.  
Questionnaires were collected directly from participants, and out of a sample of 400 
officers at 16 sites, 296 police officers voluntarily completed the questionnaire, giving a 
74% response rate.  The respondents consisted of 217 males (73.3%) and 79 females 
(26.7%).  Forty-four percent were between the ages of 30-39 years, while 39 % were 
aged 40 or over.  Over 75% had a college or graduate degree.  Almost half (46.3%) had 
been in the police force for 10 years or less, with 11.65 years being the average years of 
service. 
Questionnaire Design 
The questionnaire consisted of two parts.  The first part measured whistleblowing 
intention and the three determinants of TPB, that is, attitude, subject norm, and 
perceived behavior control.  Whistleblowing intention was measured through a total of 8 
items, asking the question “If you found wrongdoing in your workplace, how hard 
would you try to do the following?”  A 5-point Likert-type scale was employed to rate 
statements that ranged from Not at all (1) to Very hard (5).  A principal axis factor 
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analysis with varimax rotation of the 8 items resulted in two factors, 4 each for internal 
and external whistleblowing, and accounted for 72.3% of the variance with main factor 
loadings greater than .65 and no significant cross-loadings.  The items, mean responses 
and Cronbach alpha values for the two scales are shown in Table 1a, and a factor 
analysis showing a clear two-factor solution is shown in Table 1b. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 1a and 1b about here 
-------------------------------- 
Attitudes toward whistleblowing were measured by asking how true the respondent 
thought five statements were with regard to the salient consequences of an employee‟s 
reporting of wrongdoing in an organization.  In addition, the respondents were asked to 
evaluate the importance of those consequences, under the question, “If you reported 
wrongdoing, how important do you think the following consequences would be to 
you?”  Those five salient consequences of an employee‟s whistleblowing are: 
prevention of harm to the organization; control of corruption; enhancement of public 
interest; performing one‟s duty as an employee; and moral satisfaction on one‟s part.  
The statements or items under the above two questions were rated on a 5-point Likert-
type scale.  The scale of the first question was ranged from Not true (1) to Very true 
(5), and that of the second question, the importance of the five consequences was rated 
on the same scale from Not very important (1) to Very important (5).  The responses to 
each statement given under the first question were multiplied by each evaluation of the 
five consequences respectively, and summed for the mean of the sample.  Those 
statements, their means and the Cronbach alpha value are reported in Table 2. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------- 
The overall means of the items of outcomes as well as their evaluation are higher 
than 3.50 on average, indicating that the respondents more or less agree 
whistleblowing has positive effects and they are important. 
Subjective norm was measured by two questions.  The first measured normative 
beliefs, which are a person‟s thoughts about the likelihood that important referent 
persons would approve or disapprove of a respondent‟s reporting of wrongdoing in an 
organization, asking, “How proud of you do you think the following persons would be 
if you reported wrongdoing?”  The salient groups of referents were five: members of 
one‟s family, coworkers, immediate supervisor, friends, and neighbors.  The 
respondent‟s motivations to comply with the expectations of the referents were 
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measured by the second question, “How much do you care whether the following 
persons would approve or disapprove of your reporting of wrongdoing?”  In both 
questions, the respondents were rated on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from Not 
much (1) to Very much (5) for the first question, and from Very little (1) to Very much 
(5) for the second question.  The normal beliefs of approval or disapproval of the 
referents, which the respondents believe, was multiplied by the respondent‟s 
motivation to comply with the referents‟ demands, averaged and summed to produce 
subjective norm.  Items and their means are reported in Table 3. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
-------------------------------- 
The mean of the normal beliefs in the first question was highest (3.07, s.d.=1.27) 
for members of one‟s family, and lowest (2.32, s.d.=1.10) for immediate supervisor.  
The mean of the respondent‟s motivations in the second question was highest (3.31, 
s.d.=1.22) for members of one‟s family, compared with 2.90 (s.d.=1.20) for neighbors. 
Perceived behavioral control was measured using eight items, four items for 
control factors and four items for the perceived power.  The four control factor items 
are statements concerning beliefs or perceptions about difficulties to be faced in the 
process of the reporting as well as the results of an employee‟s reporting.  The 
perceived power of the four control factors were measured as follows: an 
organization‟s hindering reporting (or ignoring it); difficulties to be faced in the 
process of reporting; no chance to correct wrongdoing; and retaliation by the 
organization.  The respondents rated the items on a 5-point Likert-type scale.  The 
control factor items were rated by a scale ranging from Not likely (1) to Very likely (5), 
and the perceived power items by a scale ranging from Not very important (1) to Very 
important (5).  The perceived behavioral control was calculated by multiplying each 
control factor by the perceived power of each control factor, and summing the results 
across four control factors.  For the items on control factors we invited respondents to 
gauge how difficult it would be to blow the whistle, and therefore a higher response 
indicated lower perceived behavioral control.  We deliberately designed the survey in 
this fashion, as participants appear to find it easier to gauge difficulty rather than ease 
of reporting, but for data analysis we re-coded the responses such that a high score in 
the tables indicates high perceived behavioral control. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------------- 
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As shown in the Table 4, the range of values for perceived behavioral control was 
relatively narrow from 2.61 for “the difficulties to be faced in the process of my 
reporting”, to 3.08 for “the organization will hinder/ignore my reporting every step of 
the way”, and there are few differences in evaluated importance among the four items. 
    
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Using the Theory of Planned Behavior as the basis for exploring how 
whistleblowing intentions are determined by belief systems, the authors conducted a 
correlation analysis of whistleblowing intentions and the three determinants of Ajzen‟s 
theory.  Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics and the correlations among the 
variables. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
-------------------------------- 
The results in Table 2 indicate that intention to blow the whistle internally (M = 
3.01) is higher than that for external whistleblowing (M = 2.13) Both internal and 
external whistleblowing intentions were significantly related to the three determinants 
in TPB in the predicted direction, with the exception of the relations between external 
whistleblowing and perceived behavioral control which was in the predicted direction, 
but not significant.  In their study of drivers‟ violations, Parker et al. (1992) found the 
relation between subjective norm and intention was stronger than that between 
attitudes and intention.  Likewise, in this study the correlations of subjective norm with 
internal whistleblowing (.419, p<.000) and external whistleblowing (.328, p<.000) 
were stronger than those of attitude with internal and external whistleblowing (.374, 
p<.000 and .252, p<.000 respectively). 
In order to examine in more detail the roles of the three determinants suggested by 
TPB, two regression analyses were conducted using whistleblowing intentions as the 
dependent variables.  Table 6 shows the results of multiple regressions of 
whistleblowing intentions.   
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
-------------------------------- 
As can be seen, for both types of whistleblowing the explanatory power of the three 
determinants is weaker than expected.  For the regression analysis of internal 
whistleblowing intention, the independent variables explained 24.9 percent of the 
variance (F = 33.577, p = .000), with all three determinants being significant 
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predictors.  For external whistleblowing intention the independent variables explained 
10.8 percent of the variance (F = 12.828, p = .000) but only subjective norm was a 
significant predictor in the regression model.  Overall then, the results show that TPB 
has a significant capacity to predict whistleblowing intentions, but the effects of the 
determinants on an employee‟s intentions to blow the whistle differ depending on the 
type of whistleblowing. 
Hypothesis I was that the effects of perceived behavior control will be greater on the 
intention of internal whistleblowing than that of external whistleblowing, and this is 
clearly supported.  The effect of perceived behavioral control was significant for 
internal but not external whistleblowing intentions.  Hypothesis II, that subjective norm 
will have a greater effect on intention for external whistleblowing than for internal 
whistleblowing, was neither clearly supported or rejected in the results of the regression 
analysis – the effect of subjective norm was positively significant for both internal and 
external whistleblowing, with similar B and beta values.  However, what we can say is 
the subjective norm is clearly a more important predictor for external whistleblowing – 
whereas for internal whistleblowing, all three TPB predictors are significant, for 
external whistleblowing intentions only attitude and subjective norm show a significant 
correlation, and only subjective norm is significant in the regression analysis.   
  
DISCUSSION 
The key findings of this study were twofold: (1) TPB is valid in predicting 
intentions to blow the whistle.  Although its explanatory power wasn‟t as high as 
expected, it still adds to our understanding of what drives employees to blow the 
whistle, and shows that TPB has considerable potential as a parsimonious general 
theory for explaining whistleblowing;  (2) The roles and effects of the three 
determinants of Ajzen‟s theory were different depending on the type of 
whistleblowing. 
 
Limitations of the study 
The choice of South Korean police officers as a sample is in itself a valuable 
contribution to whistleblowing research – in terms of both occupation and nationality 
they represent a very different population to those normally studied by whistleblowing 
researchers.  We acknowledge that it is a very specific sample and as such lowers the 
external validity of the study, though the study might nevertheless be relevant to 
uniform services, or indeed any occupation where there is a strong emphasis on both 
hierarchy and a team ethos.  However, before seeking to generalize from these results, 
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one would need to repeat the study for a greater range of occupations. 
Whilst our use of intention as a proxy measure of whistleblowing behavior 
represents a demonstrable improvement on the use of attitude as a proxy measure, it 
must always be acknowledged that failure to use whistleblowing behavior itself as the 
dependent variable is a limitation, notwithstanding the considerable challenges that 
would pose for the researcher. 
 
Implications for practice 
The findings have implications both for policymakers concerned with improving 
whistleblower protection and managers concerned with improving ethical behavior and 
risk management in their organizations.  The formal channels for reporting inadequate 
or illegal practices in an organization, such as confidential telephone hotlines (now 
mandatory under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act), can be seen as a form of internal 
whistleblowing and our findings indicate that all three predictors represent important 
factors for increasing intention to blow the whistle internally.  This suggests that 
interventions aimed at changing employees‟ attitude towards whistleblowing, the 
prevailing norms about it, and the extent to which they perceive they would be able to 
do so effectively, could all make a significant contribution to improving business 
ethics. 
For organizations, the strategy of encouraging internal whistleblowing has two 
further benefits.  Firstly, it improves risk management by making it less likely that 
unacceptable practices will go undetected.  Secondly, by increasing the likelihood of 
internal whistleblowing, they should reduce the likelihood of external whistleblowing, 
which is generally viewed by organizations as having negative consequences for 
reputation.  When an organization has put in place effective procedures for internal 
reporting, it might be legitimate for the organization to seek to discourage external 
whistleblowing, and our findings also suggest where management interventions might 
be targeted, for example on subjective norm and attitudes towards external 
whistleblowing (as perceived behavioral control does not appear to be a significant 
factor). 
 
Theoretical implications 
We noted at the outset that reliance on attitudes as a proxy measure has been a 
weakness in whistleblowing research, and in this study our use of TPB has allowed us 
to develop a usefully disaggregated analysis, separating attitude from intention and 
contributing to understanding of the gap between attitude toward whistleblowing and 
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the actual intention to blow the whistle.  The results suggest the difference between 
attitude and intention might be explained by the three determinants of TPB.  The role 
of attitude toward whistleblowing was quite different in influencing intentions for 
internal versus external whistleblowing.  For example, for external whistleblowing the 
only significant variable for predicting its intention was subjective norm.  This 
suggests one way in which the gap of attitude and intention is created for the different 
behaviors of internal and external whistleblowing.  The influence of attitude in 
explaining the intention of external whistleblowing is not as great as for internal 
whistleblowing, which explains why the widely-observed disjunction between attitude 
and intention is greater for external whistleblowing than internal.  One way to interpret 
this is to think about the nature of the decision to blow the whistle (Blenkinsopp & 
Edwards, 2008).  Whereas internal whistleblowers may be surprised at the response to 
their reporting (Alford, 2001), the external whistleblowers know they are taking a 
major step which will not be well received by the organization.  For them, the decision 
becomes less „should I do this?‟ (attitude) or „will I be able to do this?‟ (perceived 
behavioral control) but more „will I survive doing this?‟  Such a decision will be 
crucially influenced by what they believe significant others will think of their actions.  
We might speculate whether there is also a methodological issue here, in that since 
external whistleblowing is clearly an altogether less likely act, participants are 
answering a much more hypothetical question – all four items for external 
whistleblowing intention show a lower response than even the lowest item for internal 
whistleblowing intentions. 
 
Implications for future research 
This study has a number of implications for future research.  Firstly, and most 
obviously, there is a need to undertake similar research with a representative range of 
samples.  There is no obvious reason to imagine that TPB would work as a general 
theory for South Korean police officers and no-one else, but the findings relating to 
which determinants best predict which type of whistleblowing need further research – 
Ajzen (1991, p.188) notes that the relative importance of the determinants will vary 
according to behavior and situation.  For example, Chang (1998) found in his study of 
the prediction of unauthorized copying of software, that perceived behavioral control 
was a better determinant in predicting behavioral intention than attitude, and subjective 
norm didn‟t have a significant direct effect on behavioral intention, but its indirect 
effect through attitude was highly significant.  In future studies, it would be important 
to explore whether factors such as occupation or organization may influence the role 
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played by the three determinants in explaining whistleblowing intentions. 
Wated & Sanchez (2005) suggest the roles of the three determinants could also 
significantly vary according to national cultural dimensions such as individualism or 
collectivism.  For example, subjective norm might be more important in a collective 
society.  Thus, a cross-cultural study of whistleblowing using the theory of planned 
behavior could contribute to the exploration of the roles that different underlying 
factors play in motivating individuals from different cultures to blow the whistle. 
 
CONLUSION 
The lack of a general theory has been a limitation to our understanding of 
whistleblowing.  This study has attempted to explore the validity of Ajzen‟s Theory of 
Planned Behavior, which is widely accepted as a general framework for predicting 
behavioral intentions but is rarely used in whistleblowing studies.  The results of this 
study showed TPB is valid as a general theory for explaining whistleblowing 
intentions, which adds to our understanding of the general approaches to 
whistleblowing described by earlier studies although we recognize that (in this study at 
least) the theory was more effective in explaining internal rather than external 
whistleblowing intentions.  Among the three determinants of the theory taken into 
account, attitude and perceived behavioral control appear to be the most important 
factors to be considered if seeking to encourage internal whistleblowing.  The findings 
could extend an organization‟s ability to predict whistleblowing intentions in the real 
world, and guide managerial efforts to improve the effectiveness of reporting channels 
aimed at ensuring the reporting of unethical practices within organizations.   
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TABLE 1a 
Scale Items, Alpha and Means for Whistleblowing Intentions (N= 296) 
Whistleblowing 
route 
Items Mean 
response 
Overall 
average  
 
External (EW)
1
 Report it to the appropriate authorities 
outside of the organization 
2.40 
2.13 
Use the reporting channels outside of the 
organization 
2.13 
Provide information to outside agencies 1.93 
Inform the public of it 2.05 
Internal (IW)
2
 Report it to the appropriate persons within 
the organization 
3.10 
3.01 
Use the reporting channels inside of the 
organization 
3.11 
Let upper level of management know 
about it 
2.90 
Tell my supervisor about it  2.94 
1Cronbach alpha =.855, 2Cronbach alpha =.878 
 
TABLE 1b 
Results of Factor Analysis on Whistleblowing Intentions items (N= 296) 
Items F1 F2 
Report it to the appropriate authorities outside of the organization .786 -.025 
Use the reporting channels outside of the organization .777 -.061 
Provide information to outside agencies .748 -.127 
Inform the public of it .677 .051 
Report it to the appropriate persons within the organization -.018 .669 
Use the reporting channels inside of the organization -.014 .663 
Let upper level of management know about it -.172 .660 
Tell my supervisor about it  .094 .659 
Eigenvalues 13.84 11.55 
Cumulative Percents 19.49 35.75 
 
TABLE 2 
Scale Items and Means for Attitude toward Whistleblowing (A) (N= 296) 
Items Beliefs about the 
consequences (b)
1
 
Mean (s.d.) 
Evaluation of the 
consequences (e) 
Mean (s.d.) 
(b x e) 
Mean 
Prevention of harm 
to the organization 
3.80(1.12) 3.84(1.09) 15.20 
Control of 
corruption 
3.86(1.02) 3.72(1.06) 14.92 
In the public interest 3.50(1.16) 3.63(1.05) 13.44 
Whistleblowing as Planned Behavior 18 
 18 
One‟s duty as a 
public employee 
3.52(1.19) 3.63(1.09) 13.51 
Morally appropriate 3.50(1.24) 3.71(1.12) 13.86 
Overall average  3.64(.873) 3.71(.887) 14.19 
1Cronbach alpha =.818 
A: Sum of (b x e) = 70.94 
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TABLE 3 
Scale Items and Means for Subjective Norm (SN) (N= 296) 
Items Normative beliefs (b) 
Mean (s.d.) 
Motivation to comply 
(m) 
Mean (s.d.) 
(b x m) 
Mean 
Members of one‟s 
family 
3.07(1.27) 3.31(1.22) 10.73 
Coworkers  2.46(1.20) 3.23(1.19) 8.36 
Immediate 
supervisor 
2.32(1.10) 3.15(1.20) 7.68 
Friends 3.00(1.23) 3.02(1.16) 9.54 
Neighbors 2.84(1.28) 2.90(1.20) 8.77 
Overall average 2.74(.922) 3.12(.964) 9.01 
SN: Sum of (b x m) = 45.07 
 
TABLE 4 
Scale Items and Means for Perceived Behavioral Control (PBC) (N= 296) 
Items Belief in control 
factors (bcf)
1
 
Mean (s.d.) 
Evaluation of 
control factors (ecf) 
Mean (s.d.) 
(bcf x ecf) 
Mean 
The organization‟s 
hindering reporting 
(or ignoring it) 
3.08(1.18) 3.26(1.17) 10.04 
Difficulties to be 
faced in the process 
of reporting 
2.61(1.26) 3.29(1.14) 8.59 
Reporting likely to 
be ineffective in 
ending wrongdoing 
2.78(1.15) 3.29(1.13) 9.15 
Retaliation by the 
organization 
2.92(1.22) 3.26(1.26) 9.52 
Overall average 2.85(1.02) 3.30(.97) 9.41 
1Cronbach alpha =.868 
PBC: Sum of (bcf x ecf) = 46.71 
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TABLE 5 
Descriptive Statistics and the Correlation between 
Whistleblowing Intentions and the independent variables (N=296) 
 IW EW A SN PBC 
IW 1.00     
EW .446** 1.00    
A .374** .252** 1.00   
SN .419** .328** .515** 1.00  
PBC .278** .028 .094 .158** 1.00 
1) **p<.01.; two tailed tests. 
2) See Tables 1 to 4 for abbreviations.   
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TABLE 6 
Results of Multiple Regressions of the Three Determinants of Ajzen’s Theory for 
Whistleblowing Intentions (N=296) 
1) ***p<.001; 2-tailed tests. 
2) The figures in parentheses are standardized regression coefficients. 
3) See Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 for abbreviations.  
 
FIGURE 1. Whistleblowing Intention in the Theory of Planned Behavior 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predictors Dependent Variables 
Internal 
Whistleblowing 
External 
Whistleblowing 
Attitude toward Whistleblowing (A) .039*** (.215) .017  (.110) 
Subjective Norm (SN) .064*** (.277) .055***  (.275) 
Perceived Behavioral Control (PBC) .074*** (.214) -.008 (-.025) 
Constant 1.236*** 1.448*** 
Adjusted R square .249 .108 
F value 33.577 12.828 
Significance .000 .000 
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Perceived Behavior 
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